I have looked at the effect of global late-stage (Part 5), mid-stage (Part 6) and early-stage (Part 7) petroleum export mitigation on predicted regional petroleum consumption from my PIE analysis, and even examined a global total petroleum sharing scenario and its population implication (Part 8).
In this penultimate post, I first survey the predicted global and regional population changes associated with my original PIE analysis (see Part 1 through Part 10 of my past series, and Part 1 to Part 3 of the present series) and the various mitigation scenarios described in Parts 5-8.
Then I end with a broad overview of the global population implications of all of the different petroleum consumption scenarios explored in this series.
Population scenario based on the trends predicted from the PIE analysis
Figure 58 presents the regional and world populations based on the
census bureau’s data from 1965 to 2011, and then the populations of the different regions based on the PIE analysis from 2012 to 2065. US
As you can see, the global population starts a gradual downturn immediately in 2012 based on the prediction of an immediate population decline in AF followed by a population decline in FS in the mid-2020s. Regular readers of this series may recall that with their predicted trends of declining domestic production, increasing proportions of petroleum being exported, and little imports, both AF and FS would drive their consumption into sharp downtrend resulting in their per capita consumption rate falling below 1 b/py.
Consequently, the populations of AF and FS are predicted to be back to their year-1900 levels of 0.14 b and 0.12 billion by 2026 and 2025, respectively. Under this scenario, the total population decline in AF and FS from 2011 to 2026 equals just over 1 billion.
And yet the total world population decline over this period is only 0.37 billion. Why? Because, except for JP, all six of the other regions (ME, NA, SA, EU, CH and rAP) have net population increases over this period—a total increase of about 0.7 billion of this period. Just rAP alone has a population increase of 0.44 billion.
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure 58, after reaching a local minimum of 6.5 billion in 2025, the world population starts to increase again to 6.7 billion by 2030. But, then rAP’s population starts to decline as its per capita consumption rate also drops below 1 b/py.
Additionally, the declining population growth trends for CH and EU predicted by the census bureau finally reach zero in 2026 and 2022 and then turns to negative growth or de-growth, which contributes further the world population decline.
JP and EP suffer moderate population collapses starting in 2034 and 2039 when their per capita consumption rate also drops below 1 b/py.
Finally, SA hit a zero population growth rate in 2060, leaving just ME and NA as the remaining two regions whose population is projected to still be in positive growth trend.
The global population drops below 6 billion by 2037 and below 5 billion 16 years later in 2053; the population declines much more slowly thereafter to 4.9 billion by the end of the study period in 2065.
Population scenario based on the PIE analysis trend plus late-stage mitigation
Figure 59 once again shows the regional and world populations based on the
census bureau’s data from 1965 to 2011, and then from 2012 to 2065, the populations based on the PIE analysis trends overlaid with late-stage mitigation, i.e., regional exports are mitigated when a region’s per capita consumption drops to 1 b/py. US
The two most obvious differences as compared to Figure 58, is that now, the global population continues growing to 7.6 billion in 2021 before declining, and, that there is not much of a secondary growth peak in the population in the 2030s.
Late stage export mitigation allows AF to stay at 1 b/py until 2021, and so its population continues along the lines predicted by the census bureau to nearly 1.3 billion before the population collapses back down to year-1900 levels by 2032.
Likewise, the population decline in FS, due to per capita consumption dropping below 1 b/py, doesn’t start until about 2042, and, year-1900 levels are not reached until 2048.
The tiny shoulder peak around 2033 corresponds to the last year that rAP’s population continues to grow. Thereafter, rAP’s population falls from nearly 3 billion to below 2 billion by 2042 and about 1.3 billion by 2055.
Moderate population crashes start in EP and JP in 2039.
The population trends for ME, NA, SA and CH are unaffected by late-stage mitigation and these regions follow the same trends as described up for Figure 57.
By 2065 the population is down to just under 5 billion—only about 100 million higher than the population from the PIE.
Population scenario based on the PIE analysis trend plus mid-stage mitigation
By now you should know the drill: Figure 60 shows the regional and world populations based on the
census bureau’s data from 1965 to 2011, and from 2012 to 2065, the populations based on the PIE analysis trends overlaid with mid-stage mitigation, i.e., regional exports are mitigated when a region’s per capita consumption drops to 2 b/py. US
Once again there are differences compared to Figure 58, and, also there are some differences compared to Figure 59 although they are more subtle than revealed by a causal comparison of the two figures.
Mid stage export mitigation allows AF to stay at 1 b/py only until 2020, one year earlier than late-stage mitigation, and mainly because imports from rAP get cut as rAP is already mitigating its exports, and then latter on from EU as it starts to mitigate its exports. AF’s population crashes back down to year-1900 levels by 2032, the same year as in late-stage mitigation.
Population-wise FS fares exactly the same under mid-stage mitigation: the population crash still occurs in about 2043 when domestic per capita consumption drops below1 b/py, and, year-1900 levels are still reached in about 2048. The difference is that FS enjoys a per capita consumption rate of 2 b/py from 2020 to 2036.
There is still see a tiny shoulder population peak around 2033 at 6.9 billion, corresponding to the year before rAP’s population starts to drop. Under this scenario, rAP region starts to export mitigate right away, but, can only sustain its domestic per capita consumption at 2 b/py until 2016. rAP’s population drop to 2 billion now occurs a few years early in 2040, compared to late-stage (2042), drops below 1 billion by 2052 and is down to 771 million by 2065—a population that is 500 million lower than under late-stage.
The moderate population crashes in EP and JP start slightly early in 2036 and 2038.
Once again the population trends for ME, NA, SA and CH are unaffected by mid-stage mitigation and these regions follow the same trends as described up for Figure 57.
Now under mid-stage export mitigation by 2065, the world’s population is down to just under 4.5 billion—300 million less than under the PIE analysis trend, and, 500 million less than under the late-stage mitigation scenario. And, most of these population differences are due to the faster and deeper population crash in rAP.
Population scenarios based on the PIE analysis trend plus early-stage mitigation
Figures 61 and 62 shows the regional and world populations based on the
census bureau’s data from 1965 to 2011, and from 2012 to 2065, the populations based on the PIE analysis trends, overlaid with sub-scenarios (1) and (2) of my early-stage (i.e., mitigation now) scenarios. US
Under either of these sub-scenarios, within each region, we have an intra-regional-total sharing strategy with all inter-regional petroleum exports halted.
Figures 61 and 62 look pretty ugly, showing sharp population crashes, in first in JP, followed by then rAP, then AF, EU and finally FS and SA (sub-scenario (2)). The early population crash in JP for either sub-scenario is simply reflecting the fact that this region has virtually zero domestic petroleum production.
For early-stage mitigation sub-scenario (1), I assumed that each region consumes its remaining domestic petroleum resources domestically so as to keep the per capita petroleum consumption rate as high and as constant as possible throughout the entire study period, or at least at 1 b/py for as long as possible.
Under early-stage (1), despite the early population crash in JP, the world’s population still gets up to 7.6 billion by 2022, but then crashes to 5.4 billion in 2023 mainly because rAP runs out of petroleum reserves to maintain per capita consumption at 1 b/py. Keep in mind that under this scenario, with no petroleum imports, rAP would have to somehow increase its domestic production rate up 170% from 2011 levels of about 1.4 bb/y to 2.4 bb/y, just to get up to 1 b/py.
Another crash from 5.6 billion to 4.3 billion occurs in 2029, because AF’s per capita consumption drops below 1 b/py.
Still another crash to 4.1 billion occurs in 2030 as EU’s per capita consumption drops below 1 b/py.
Under this scenario, there is no population crash in FS because this region can keep itself above 1 b/py throughout the study period.
Once again the population trends for ME, NA, SA and CH are unaffected by early stage mitigation and these regions follow the same trends as described up for Figure 57.
By 2065, world the population has dropped to 4.1 billion—much lower than that predicted under the PIE analysis or the late- and mid-stage export mitigation scenarios.
For early-stage mitigation sub-scenario (2), I assumed that each region consumes its remaining domestic petroleum resources domestically at its present production rate, and, that the per capita petroleum consumption rate just follows the predicted production rate and population change rate trends.
Under early-stage (2), the populations of both JP and rAP crash the world population immediately down to 5.9 billion because their currently domestic production is not nearly enough to keep per capita consumption at 1 b/py. The population crash in rAP is not all the way back to year-1900 levels, but rather to 1.4 b which equals the domestic petroleum production rate of 1 b/py. As the domestic petroleum production rate declines, so to does the population.
The population crash accelerates in 2019 as both AF and EU drops below 1 b/py. The population decline just follows the petroleum production rate declines such that by 2030 the world population is down to 4.3 billion.
FS has a population decline in 2043 as per capita consumption drops below 1 b/py and SA’s population starts to decline in 2058.
Once again the population trends for ME, NA, and CH are unaffected by early stage mitigation and these regions follow the same trends as described up for Figure 57.
By 2065, world the population has dropped to 3.8 billion—much lower than that predicted under sub-scenario (1), the PIE analysis or the late- and mid-stage export mitigation scenarios.
Overview of the population scenarios
Finally, Figure 63 shows the world population reported and projected forward from the US census bureau, and, the six different population scenarios explored here and in Part 8.
I consider the total sharing and the early stage mitigation scenarios (1) & (2) as upper and lower book ends, respectively, for the more plausible populations scenarios represented by the PIE analysis, and PIE analysis plus late- or mid-stage export mitigation.
The total petroleum sharing scenario allows the population to continue grow along the lines predicted by the census bureau, at least until 2056 with a total population of about 9.4 billion. As I already speculated, I don’t see this as very realistic, because it would require an enormous continuous transfer of petroleum, and with in economic wealth, from ME, NA, EU, and JP to AF and rAP. It is noteworthy that the proportion of petroleum export from the ME have definitely been trending away from NA, JP and EU towards rAP and CH (see e.g., Figures 2 and 3 of Part 2). But, ME is also steadily decreasing its total exports and if that trend continues then total amounts of exports to rAP are set to decline in the next few years. I would have to see that later trend turn around before giving much credence to this scenario.
Early-stage mitigation is also implausible because under sub-scenario (2) the population would be crashing now and under sub-scenario (1) rAP would have to magically ramp up its domestic production by 70% to stave off starvation. But perhaps something in-between sub-scenarios (1) and (2) could occur. And, I can see something like sub-scenarios (1) or (2) occurring if JP and rAP were to be suddenly cut off from petroleum imports from ME and AF. For instance you may be interested in a post I wrote last summer speculating about which regions would fair the worst if the Strait of Hormuz closed.
The population scenario under the PIE analysis predicted the population in a flat to declining trend out to 2030 due to AF and FS dropping below 1 b/py if they keep up their present export trends and their production goes into decline as predicted from the logistic curve analysis. That this is not happening now also makes this scenario implausible and/or tests the assumptions of this series that AF needs a minimum of 1 b/py. Alternatively, as I have speculated before, perhaps with food aid from the other regions and off-the-record pirate petroleum consumption, AF may still consume 1 b/py going forwards. This may be a topic I explore in a future series.
That leaves the late-stage and mid-stage mitigation scenarios. As you can see from Figure 63, the world population trajectories under either of these scenarios are quite similar out at least out to about 2035. The population tops out at about 7.6 billion by 2020-2021 and then drops below 7 billion by 2027-2031. After 2035 the two scenario diverge, with a steeper global population drop under the mid-stage scenario, due to sooner and steeper population drops in AF, rAP, EU and JP.
Next time, in Part 10, I will give some final comments and thoughts for the series.