Part 5: Inter-Regional Trade Movements of Petroleum to and from Africa

In Part 1, I introduced my abbreviations, data bases and analysis methods, Part 2 presented the global trends, Part 3 presented the inter-regional trade movements to and from North America and Part 4 presented inter-regional trade movements to and from South America. 

Up to now in the series, part 2 revealed that 2007 was the peak in the total global pool of petroleum involved in inter-regional trade movements (i.e., imports and exports between any of nine regions: North America (NA); South America (SA); Europe (EU); former Soviet Union (FS); Middle East (ME); Africa (AF); China (CH); Japan (JP); Asia-Pacific remainder (APr)).  Now, as we proceed along to downside of a diminishing petroleum export pool, what are the trends suggesting how the remaining petroleum will get distributed between these nine regions?

In part 3, we saw a trend for diminishing imports to North America, especially from South America, and the Middle East, with Africa and the Former Soviet Union picking some but not all of the slack.  Exports, particularly petroleum products, from North America, especially to South America and Europe, is rising.  In part 4, we saw that those diminishing South American exports to North America were essentially being diverted to China, the other Asia Pacific countries (but not Japan) and to Europe. 

And now what are the trends for Africa?

Africa's Total Petroleum and Crude Oil Production and Consumption  Trends

Figure 1 presents AF’s total petroleum consumption rate (i.e., both domestic and imported petroleum) since 1980 as reported by the EIA or BP review (solid red circles and squares, respectively). 

Both the EIA and BP data set illustrate AF's growing consumption of petroleum from 0.5-0.55 bby in 1980 to 1.2-1.24 bby in 2010, with no plateau in sight. 

Figure 2 shows AF's total petroleum production rate (i.e. domestic production, solid blue circles and squares for EIA and BP data, respectively) and crude oil production (solid purple circles). 

Note the 3 times larger vertical scale in Figure 2 compared to Figure 1.  Since 1980 AF has been producing well over triple the petroleum that is consumes making it a relatively large petroleum exporter.  But there are clear signs that AF's rate increase in total petroleum production has slowed down since about 2005, which could be a sign of peaking production rates.  The close tracking between crude oil production (purple circles) and total petroleum production (blue circles and square) illustrates that since 1980, nearly all (over 90%) of AF's production has been crude oil production

Africa's Gross and Inter-regional Export and Import Trends

Figure 1 also shows AF's gross and inter-regional imports of total petroleum, crude oil and petroleum products.  The EIA import data (open circles) only runs from 1986 to 2008 while the BP review import data (open squares) only run from 2000 to 2010.  AF shows signs of a peak in inter-regional petroleum imports around 2007-2009.

From 1986 to 1997 AF's gross total petroleum imports (open red circles) were fairly flat at 0.3-0.4 bby, after which imports rose to 0.7 bby by 2005.  The total inter-regional imports (open squares) also shows increasing import rates for 2000 to 2007, but then a plateau for a few year and then a strong down turn in 2010.  In is apparent that that 2010 down turn in inter-regional total petroleum is reflecting a down turn in inter-regional crude imports (open brown squares).  The gross crude oil imports (open brow circles) are only slightly higher than inter-regional crude oil imports, implying that intra-regional imports (i.e., imports from one country within AF to another country within AF) are small.  The increase in total petroleum imports after 1997 is mainly explained by petroleum product imports (open green circle) which started to rise in 1997.  Inter-regional imports (open green circles) increased from 2000 to 2008 and has slight gone down since then.

Figure 2 also shows AF's gross and inter-regional total petroleum, crude and petroleum products exports.  Once again, The EIA import data (open circles) only runs from 1986 to 2008 and the BP review import data (open squares) only run from 2000 to 2010.

Gross total petroleum and crude oil exports increased fairly steadily since 1986 until 2004 when a plateau was reached.  Inter-regional exports of total petroleum and crude oil peaked in 2007 at 3.2 and 2.9 bby, and have declined to 2.9 and 2.6 bby, respectively, by 2010. 

Gross and inter-regional petroleum product exports are comparatively much smaller at 0.4 to 0.3 bby and the close similarly of gross and inter-regional numbers implies that there has very little intra-regional exports of the petroleum products within AF.

Figure 3 shows AF's total petroleum, crude oil and petroleum product imports relative to the respective gross and inter-regional global petroleum import pools.  AF’s signs of a peak in inter-regional petroleum imports around 2007-2009 is even more clear than in Figure 1.

After hitting a minimum of about 2 percent of the gross total petroleum import pool (red circles) in 1996, AF gross total petroleum imports has risen steadily to 3 percent by the last EIA reporting year 2008. Gross crude oil imports (brown circles) during this period are flat to declining at about 1.7 to 1.5 percent.  In contrast the gross product imports (green circles) increased from 0.7 percent to 1.7 percent and pointed out in the context of Figure 1, it is this which explains the increase in total petroleum imports since in1996.

AF’s inter-regional total petroleum imports (red square) corresponded about 2.5 percent of the total inter-regional import pool until 2007 when it vaulted up to 3 percent and then in 2010 fell off a cliff to below 2 percent.  Inter-regional crude oil imports (brown squares) were fairly stable at 1.5 to 1.7 percent of the total inter-regional import pool until 2010, when it dropped precipitously to 0.7 percent in 2010.  AF’s share of the inter-regional petroleum product imports pool (greensquare) increased from a steady 0.9 to 1.3 percent in 2007, but has steadily declined since then.

The trends shown here and in Figure 1 are similar to South America’s, discussed in part 4:  AF’s crude imports are flat to declining while petroleum product imports are increasing.  AF’s draw on the inter-regional import pool of petroleum at 2-3 percent is even smaller than SA’s. 

Figure 4 shows AF's exports relative to the respective total gross and inter-regional global petroleum export pools, which, of course, is about the same as the global import pool.   Analogous to the imports trends shown in Figure 3, these relative export amounts are expressed as a percentage of the total gross export pool and the total inter-regional export pool, and, these total pool sizes are different: e.g., 23 bby of gross exports in 2008 versus 17.1 bby inter-regional exports in 2008. 

Figure 4 has a much larger vertical scale than Figure 3 because AF’s contributes much more into the global export pool than it imports from—AF is a very strong relative net exporter; much stronger than SA, for example.

Except for a slight up tick in the early 90’s AF’s gross total petroleum exports (blue circles) has been quite steady at about 13 of the gross export pool.  By far it is crude oil (brown circles) that makes up the bulk of AF’s exports.  AF’s gross crude oil exports supported 11 percent of the global export pool from 1986 to 2008, with petroleum products exports (green circles) providing another 2 percent. 

AF’s total inter-regional petroleum exports (blue square) makes up an even larger portion of the inter-regional export pool, peaking at 18.5 percent in 2007 and down to 17.2 percent in 2010.  Again most of the inter-regional exports are from crude oil exports (brown square) with petroleum product imports (green squares) providing a very steady 2 percent of the total global inter-regional export pool.

African Intra-regional Export and Import Trends

The difference between the gross and inter-regional imports or exports, shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, should correspond to intra-regional trade movements of petroleum.   For the reasons presented in Part 3, I think that these differences are only rough estimates of intra-regional imports and exports.  But still, I will show the differences, with some brief commentary.

Figure 5 shows the differences between the gross and inter-regional total, crude oils and petroleum product imports, which should equal the intra-regional values for these quantities. 

As you can see the difference gross and inter-regional total petroleum imports (red triangles) is quite small, about 0.2 bby.  In comparison North American and South American intra-regional imports were 1.5 bby and 0.8 bby, respectively (see parallel figure 5 in parts 4 and 5, respectively).

Crude oil intra-regional imports (brown triangles) have increased, while product imports (green triangles) have declined, resulting in a pretty flat trend in total intra-regional petroleum exports (red triangles) at about 0.8 bby.  There is a trend for petroleum product intra-regional imports (green triangles) to be increasing and crude oil imports (brown triangles) to be decreasing.

Figure 6 shows the differences between the gross and inter-regional total, crude oil and petroleum product exports, which should equal the intra-regional export values for these quantities. 

Total petroleum intra-regional exports (blue triangle) are similarly very small, about 0.3 to 0.4 bby from 2000 to 2005 and then essentially zero since then.  Both crude oil and product intra-regional exports (brown and green triangles, respectively) are trending towards zero.

So where does AF’s petroleum exports go, and, what source was the cause of that dramatic loss in crude oil imports in 2010?  Let’s see if the BP review’s trade movement data can provide some insights.

Trade movements of total petroleum between Africa and other regions

Figure 7 show the specific quantities of petroleum, in units of bby, imported by AF FROM each of the eight other regions.  For reference, Figure 7 also shows the sum of AF's total inter-regional petroleum imports from all eight of the other regions (black "Xs"), which is the same as presented in Figure 1 (red open squares).

 

As you can see AF's inter-regional total petroleum imports (black X’s) steadily rose to 0.5 bby in 2007 and then dropped back down to 0.3 bby by 2010—that’s even lower than AF’s imports in 2000.  The drop in imports was due to a more than 50 percent decrease in imports from the Middle East (ME) from 0.33 bby in 2007 to 0.11 bby in 2010.  The overall decline in AF’s imports would have been even greater but for a slight increase in imports from Europe (EU) in 2009, and more minor increases in imports from North American (NA) and remaining Asia Pacific regions (rAP). 

The decline in petroleum imports from the ME is so dramatic that if the trend continues then EU would be AF’s number one import source. 

The BP review data doesn’t break this out, but my hunch is that the dramatic drop in crude oil imports and the increases in petroleum product imports shown in Figures 1 and 3, are likely due to a strong decline in crude oil coming from ME, and, increases in petroleum products from EU, NA and rAP. 

Figure 8 shows petroleum export from AF TO each of the eight other regions and again for reference, I show AF’s total exports (black “Xs” corresponding to the blue squares in Figure 2).  Note the much larger vertical scale compared to Figure 7, illustrating AF’s role as a relatively large net exporter of petroleum.

Figure 8 illustrates the general upward trend in AF’s total petroleum exports, and shows that EU and NA are about presently about equal major export destination for AF’s petroleum both at about 1 bby in 2010.  The trend is for increasing exports to NA with exports to EU remaining flat to decling. 

Despite the slight increases in imports from EU and NA, AF exports far more petroleum to either region: 0.11 bby from EU to AF, versus 0.95 bby from AF to EU in 2010; 0.03 bby from NA to AF versus 0.92 bby from AF to NA in 2010.

However, after peaking at 1.1 bby to NA in 2005, exports to NA have since declined to 0.85 bby.   This quantity is still about 3 times more than the 0.29 bby of petroleum that NA sends to SA (Figure 7), so SA is still a net petroleum exporter with respect to NA. 

While AF’s exports to rAP is flat at about 0.3 bby, there has been a large increase in export from AF to China (CH) and a lesser expect SA.  Over the last decade exports to CH increased from 0.12 to 0.49 bby; exports to SA increased from 0.06 to 0.13 bby—those are over 400 and 200 percent increases, respectively. 

Figures 9 and 10 present the same data as shown in Figures 7 and 8, respectively, but expressing AF's petroleum imports or exports, to or from each of the eight regions, as percentages of the total global inter-regional petroleum import/export pool ( global inter-regional imports and exports are the same) .  For reference, I also show AF petroleum imports and exports as percentages of the global petroleum import/export pool (“Xs” right vertical axis; note the different scale). 

Additionally, I have taken all of these data and made linear extrapolations of the 2000 to 2010 data (via linear regression analysis) out to 2021. 

Figure 9 shows the import trends discussed in the context of Figure 7: increasing amounts of petroleum imports from EU rAP and NA and strongly decreasing imports from ME.

Figure 10 shows the export trends discussed in the context of Figure 8:  declining exports from AF to EU and rAP, and, increasing exports from AF to NA, and SA.

The linear regression trends suggest that in about 2006 CH over took rAP as the number three export destination for AF’s petroleum exports, and, CH could eventual overtake EU as the number two export destination in about 2018.  It would take much longer for CH to overtake NA as the number destination because the trend is also from increasing exports to NA albeit at a slower rate of increase that the rate of CH’s increase.

Finally, Figures 11 and 12 show the relative changes in AF's import sources and export destinations, respectively, as a percentage of AF's total exports or imports in the years 2000 and 2010, and, as predicted in 2021, from the linear regression trend lines shown in Figures 9 and 10.

Figure 11 illustrates the trends for increased imports from EU, rAP and NA and steeply declining imports from the ME. 

In 2000 the ME was providing 77 percent of AF’s imports, and by 2010 that number was down to 37 percent.  A continuation of that trend will make ME a still important source at 16 percent in 2021, but in second place behind EU.  EU provided 19 percent of AF’s imports in 2000 but 36 percent in 2010, with an extrapolation to 47 percent in 2021.  NA and rAP were negligibly small import sources in 2000, but that was up to 8.4 and 12 in 2010, and the trend is for further increases to 11 and 15 percent in 2021—not too far behind ME.

Figure 12 illustrates how AF’s petroleum export destinations away from EU and rAP and towards NA and CH, and to a lesser extent, SA.

In 2000, overwhelmingly, AF’s exports went to EU (44%), NA (30% ) and rAP (16%), with CH a distant fourth (5.6%).  By 2010, CH (17%) had surpassed rAP (11%) and NA (33%) was receiving nearly the same proportion of AF’s exports as EU (33%).  By 2021, the trend is for both NA (39%) and CH (28%) to have surpassed EU (23%), and, SA (6%) is predicted to be receiving more of AF’s petroleum than rAP (3%).

Summary and Conclusions

AF’s petroleum exports of 2 to 3 bby over the last decade (Figure 2) has accounted for about 16-18 percent of the inter-regional global petroleum export pool (Figure 4).  Over this period Africa’s petroleum inter-regional imports reached a peak of about 0.5 bby or 3 percent of the global import/export pool in 2007, and then dropped precipitously to 0.3 bby 1.8 percent of the global ppol in 2010.  The drop appears to be due a large decrease in crude oil going from the Middle East to Africa.  Increasing petroleum product imports, mainly from Europe, have partially offset the declining imports. 

In the past decade, Africa's inter-regional exports of petroleum have shifted away from Europe and the remaining Asia Pacific region (which excludes China and Japan), towards North America, China and to a much lesser extent, South America (Figure 12).  If these trends continue, by 2021, Africa’s number one and two export destinations would become North America and China, respectively, with Europe in third place.  

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Next time, I head north to examine Europe’s petroleum Export and Import Trends. 

Part 4: Inter-Regional Trade Movements of Petroleum to and from South America

In Part 1, I introduced my abbreviations, data bases and analysis methods, and in Part 2, I presented the global trends.   Part 3 presented the inter-regional trade movements to and from North America. 

Some comments I have received in response to the previous parts suggests that some people are having trouble comprehending what I am trying to do in this series.  So, I will go over some introductory material again and better explain some of the finer points of this analysis.

My main focus here is looking at the movements of petroleum between nine major global regions:

1) North America (NA)

2) South America (SA)

3) Europe (EU)

4) former Soviet Union (FS)

5) Middle East (ME)

6) Africa (AF)

7) China (CH)

8) Japan (JP)

9) Asia-Pacific remainder (APr)

I selected these regions because the yearly BP’s “Statistical Review of World Energy” (“BP review”), has either directly presented the inter-area movements between these regions, or, I can derive inter-regional movements between these regions from this data. 

This type of data has been reported in the BP review every year since 2000, but to the best of my knowledge, no one has ever tried to look at and publically report an analysis of the trends in these data over time.  The BP review and the EIA also report yearly total, crude and product imports and exports, and I also looked at these data.

Note that I am looking at the trade movements of petroleum, i.e., inter-regional imports and exports, between these regions.  Therefore, for example, if I am talking about North American inter-regional imports and exports, then I am not talking about movements between countries within that region. 

The imports and exports of petroleum between the USA and Canada, USA and Mexico or Mexico and Canada, are all what I have called intra-regional trade movements within North America.  It is the imports and exports of any of these three countries within the North American region, to or from any other country in any of the other eight regions is what I call an inter-regional trade movement.

With the exception of North America (NA), the BP review doesn’t provide enough data to specifically account for the intra-regional trade movements.  For instance, to assess this for Europe (EU) one would have to have all the exports and imports of petroleum between all of the countries within EU.  The same would be the case for AF, SA, FS, APr, and ME.  As explained in Part 1, I can get an indirect estimate of intra-regional trade movements by looking at the difference between gross import and export numbers reported by the EIA and the inter-regional numbers from the BP reviews.  However, as further explained in Part 3, when I applied this to NA the intra-regional import and exports didn’t agree particularly well with the intra-regional imports and exports reported in the BP review data.  This suggests that this difference method can only provide a very rough estimate of intra-regional trade movements.

Note that even though each of the nine regions are either net importers or net exporters of petroleum, each one of these regions still likely have both inter-regional imports and exports.  For example, even though North America (NA) is a strong net importer, it still exports petroleum.  Just because NA’s inter-regional exports are trending upwards and imports are trend downwards, doesn’t mean that it has become a net exporter, although if this trend continued long enough, and there was still petroleum production, then NA could become a net exporter.  That is a story for another series.  Likewise, even though South America (SA) is a net exporter, it still also imports a significant amount of the petroleum it consumes.  South America presently exports more petroleum than it imports, but if there were a trend in the direction of less exports and increasing imports then I think you can see that SA could become a net importer. 

To be more nuanced, the BP trade movement data, and further derivation of regional data from the present study, allows me to examine the specific relationship of petroleum trade movements between each of these nine regions.  For example, it could be that SA is or becomes a net importer of petroleum with respect to Africa, or maybe some day North America, while at the same time being a net exporter of petroleum to China or the remaining Asia Pacific regions.

Note that this study does not directly assess the total size of the global or regional petroleum export/import pools going forward.  I have already did that kind of study in the past, based on an Export Land Model using a nonlinear least squares analysis of the Hubbert Equation of the petroleum production and consumption data elsewhere reported in the BP review (see http://crash-watcher.blogspot.com/2011/04/estimating-end-of-global-petroleum.html and subsequent parts). 

I think that the present series is interesting in its own right, because as I said, I haven’t seen anyone, publically at least, look at the trends of these trade movement and analyze their implications.  However, in the future, I would like to I add the results of the present study to an expanded version of my previous Export Land Model analysis.  But again, that is a series for another day.

Well, with this further review and explanation out of the way, let’s get on with the results for South America.

South American Gross and Inter-regional Export and Import Trends

Figure 1 presents SA’s total petroleum consumption (i.e., both domestic and imported),  and, the gross and inter-regional imports of total petroleum, crude oil and petroleum products, all from the data reported by the EIA or BP. 

As you can see in the figure, the BP and EIA total consumption numbers (red circles and squares at the top) while slightly differing in value, both illustrate the long-term trend of increasing petroleum consumption in SA since at least 1985.  After a plateau from 1999-2003, petroleum consumption has taken off and was about 2.2-2.3 bby in 2010.

Total gross petroleum imports (open red circles) has been steadily rising since 1986, the first EIA reporting year.  In 2008, the last EIA reporting year, gross petroleum imports of 1.3 bby provided for about 60% of total consumption.  The total inter-regional petroleum imports (open red squares) were much lower ranging from 0.4 to 0.6 bby from 2000 to 2010.  That is about 27% of total consumption in 2010, implying that there is a relative larger amount of intra-regional trade movements of petroleum in SA (about 0.8 bby, from Figure 5 below).  I suspect that the intra-regional trade movements of petroleum would largely involve exports from Brazil or Venezuela to other countries in SA, which by the way, includes Central America.   

SA’s gross crude imports (open brown circles) have slowly, but steadily increased from 0.56 to 0.7 bby from 1986 to 2008, but, the inter-regional imports (open brown squares) have been declining from 0.3 to 0.15 bby from 2000 to 2010.  This would suggest a trend of increased refining of crude oil within SA.

SA’s gross (open green circles) and inter-regional petroleum product imports (open green squares) are both increasing quite dramatically: gross petroleum product imports increased from 0.18 to 0.6 bby from 1986 to 2008, while inter-regional petroleum product imports increased from 0.08 to 0.43 bby from 2000 to 2010.  Again the difference between gross and inter-region product imports implies that there are substantially amounts of intra-regional petroleum product imports (see Figure 6 below).

Figure 2 presents SA’s total petroleum production (i.e. domestic production, blue circles and squares for EIA and BP data, respectively), crude oil production (purple circles), and the gross and inter-regional total petroleum, crude and petroleum products exports. 

I kept the vertical scales of Figures 1 and 2 the same as each other to better illustrate that SA is a net exporter of petroleum.  Figure 2 illustrates that until about 1998 a large fraction of SA’s production was crude oil (purple circles).  Thereafter, crude production rate has flattened out, even though total petroleum production continues to increase, with a prominent dip in 2001-2003.

SA's total gross petroleum exports (open blue circles) have oscillated with increasing amplitude since the late 1990s, but the recent trend is a peak in 2006 at 2.2 bby and down trend in 2007-2008.  The inter-regional total petroleum exports (open blue squares) have not oscillated as widely, and the decade long trend is up, but for last 5 years, inter-regional total exports are flat at about 1.3-1.4 bby.

The gross total petroleum export rate oscillates because both gross crude and petroleum product export rates have oscillated.  For instance, gross crude oil exports (brown open circles) peaked once in 1998 and then again in 2005.  In comparison, the inter-regional crude oil exports (brow open squares) is much more steadily increasing, except for a dip in 2003.  For instance, gross petroleum product exports (green open circles) peaked in 2001 and again in 2006, with a down trend since then.  The inter-regional petroleum product exports also appears to have peaked in 2006.

In part 2 (Figures 2 and 3), I showed that the total global import and export pools of petroleum showed signs of plateauing and peaking around 2006-07, and so it is interesting for me to look at regional trends relative to these flat to diminishing global import and export pools. Note that the gross and inter-regional petroleum import/export pools are not the same size.  For example, from Figure 2 in Part 2, in 2008, the total gross global petroleum import pool was 22.6 bby, while the total global inter-regional petroleum import pool was 17.1 bby.

Figure 3 shows SA's imports relative to the respective total gross and inter-regional global petroleum import pools. 

The gross and inter-regional crude oil imports as a percentage of the global import pool are both strongly trending downwards while petroleum product imports are strongly trending upwards. 

The sum of these two opposite trends adds up to the gross total petroleum imports, as a percentage of the global import pool, being about 6 %, and slightly trending downwards, while the total inter-regional petroleum imports, being about 3% of the total global pool, is trending upwards.  Basically, the downward trend in gross crude oil imports is stronger than the upward trend in gross petroleum product imports, but the upward trend inter-regional product imports is stronger than the inter-regional downward trend in inter-regional crude oil imports. 

These details are somewhat confusing I know, so keep in mind the broad picture that both the EIA’s gross import data and the BP’s inter-regional import data, suggest less importation of crude oil and more importation of petroleum products.  And, that SA is a relatively small drawer, 3%, of the global import pool.

Figure 4 shows SA's exports relative to the respective total gross and inter-regional global petroleum export pools, which, of course, is about the same as the global import pool.   Also analogous to the imports trends shown in Figure 3, these relative export amounts are expressed as a percentage of the total gross export pool and the total inter-regional export pool, and, these total pool sizes are different: e.g., 23 bby of gross exports in 2008 versus 17.1 bby inter-regional exports in 2008. 

I kept the same vertical scale as used in Figure 3 to make the point clear that SA’s petroleum exports greater than its imports—that is a net exporter. 

SA’s gross total petroleum exports (blue open circles), as a percentage of the total gross petroleum export pool (blue circles), appears to have lots of oscillation: an absolute peak in 1997 at 9.8 %, dropping to 8.1% in 2004, then back up to 9.2%, before dropped back down to 8.2% in 2008, the last reporting year for the EIA. 

The absolute peak in 1997 is largely due to an absolute peak in gross crude exports (brown open circles) in 1997-98.  A peak in gross petroleum product exports (green open circles) helped to slow the decline in total gross exports, as did another spike in crude oil exports in 2005. 

The inter-regional petroleum export trend is calmer.  Total interregional petroleum exports (open blue squares) have ranged from 7-8 percent of the total global petroleum export pool.  Interregional exports of crude oil (open brown squares) dipped to a low of 4.7% of the total export pool in 2003 and has steadily increase since ten to 5.8% in 2010.  Inter-regional petroleum product exports (open green squares) peaked in 2004, at 3% and has steadily declined since then to 2% in 2010.

South American Intra-regional Export and Import Trends

The difference between the gross and inter-regional imports or exports, shown in Figures 1 and 2, respectively, should correspond to intra-regional movements of petroleum.   For the reasons presented in Part 3, I think that these differences are only rough estimates of intra-regional imports and exports.  But still, I will show the differences here, with some brief commentary.

Figure 5 shows the differences between the gross and inter-regional total, crude oils and petroleum product imports, which should equal the intra-regional values for these quantities. 

Crude oil intra-regional imports (brown triangles) have increased, while product imports (green triangles) have declined, resulting in a pretty flat trend in total intra-regional petroleum exports (red triangles) at about 0.8 bby.

Figure 6 shows the differences between the gross and inter-regional total, crude oil and petroleum product exports, which should equal the intra-regional export values for these quantities. 

Crude oil intra-regional exports spiked in 2005 and intra-regional petroleum product exports have steadily declined, leading to a total intra-regional petroleum export trend with a spike in 2005 and overall downward trend to 0.56 bby by 2010.

Trade movements of total petroleum between Sorth America and other regions

Figure 7 show the specific quantities, in bby, of petroleum imported to SA FROM each of the eight other regions.  For reference, Figure 7 also shows the sum of SA's total inter-regional petroleum imports from all eight of the other regions (black "Xs"), which is the same as presented in Figure 1 (red open squares).

SA's total inter-regional petroleum imports were quite steady at 0.4 bby from 2000 to 2005 and then started to increase.  This appears to be mainly due to an increase in imports from NA and AF (especially the spike from AF in 2005) and to a lesser extent from EU and APr. 

At the same time, imports from the ME and FS have fallen.  In 2000 ME was the top import source, in 2010 NA is the top source with AF in second, and APr in third; ME is tied with EU in fourth or fifth place and FS is essentially at 0 (i.e., 0.005 bby).

Figure 8 shows petroleum export from SA TO each of the eight other regions and again for reference, I show SA’s total exports (black “Xs” corresponding to the blue squares in Figure 2).  Note the larger vertical scale compared to Figure 7, illustrating SA’s position as a net exporter.

Figure 8 illustrates the upward trend in SA’s petroleum exports, and that NA is by far the major export destination for SA’s  petroleum.  However, after peaking at 1.1 bby to NA in 2005, exports to NA have since declined to 0.85 bby.   This quantity is still about 3 times more than the 0.29 bby of petroleum that NA sends to SA (Figure 7), so SA is still a net petroleum exporter with respect to NA. 

EU has also been a substantial destination for SA’s petroleum exports at about 0.1 bby, but, recently CH and APr risen to replace EU as the number two and three destinations.  

Figures 9 and 10 present the same data as shown in Figures 7 and 8, respectively, but expressing SA's petroleum imports or exports, to or from each of the eight regions, as percentages of the total global inter-regional petroleum import/export pool (of course, on a global scale inter-regional imports and exports are the same) .  For reference, I also show SA petroleum imports and exports as percentages of the global petroleum import/export pool (“Xs” right vertical axis; note the different scale). 

Additionally, I have taken all of these data and made linear extrapolations of the 2000 to 2010 data (via linear regression analysis) out to 2021. 

Figure 9 nicely shows the import trends discussed in the context of Figure 7: increasing amounts of petroleum imports from NA, AF, EU and APr, and decreasing imports from ME and FS.

Indeed, the linear regression trends suggest that imports from ME and FS are pretty well ending, and going forward, SA will look to NA, AF, APr and EU in that order for its imports.

Likewise, Figure 10 nicely shows the export trend discussed in the context of Figure 8:  declining exports from SA to NA, increasing exports from SA to CH and APr, and a slight uptrend in exports to EU.  SA’s total petroleum exports have been fairly stable at 8% of the total export pool.

The linear regression trends suggest that CH is about to overtake EU as the number two export destination of SA’s petroleum, and that APr would overtake EU after 2021. Comparing Figures 9 and 10, if the linear extrapolations are accurately predictive, then NA would become a net exporter to SA in about 2021. 

Finally, Figures 11 and 12 show the relative changes in SA's import sources and export destinations, respectively, as a percentage of SA's total exports or imports in the years 2000 and 2010, and, as predicted in 2021, from the linear regression trend lines.

Figure 11 illustrates the trends for increased imports from NA, AF, APr, EU, and even CH which is made almost the same relative contribution (6.2%) to SA’s imports as EU’s (6.3%) and CH is predicted to make a larger contribution than EU by 2021. 

NA’s growing role as an import source to SA is also quite clear in Figure 11.  SA looked to NA for 30% of its petroleum imports in 2000, and 50% in 2010, and the linear regression trend line predicts 62% in 2021. 

Also prominent in Figure 11 is the disappearance of ME and FS as petroleum import sources.  From 38% and 15%, respectively, of SA’s imports in 2000, to 7 and 1% respectively, in 2010, and a prediction of zero well before 2021.  ME and FS went from SA’s number one and number three import sources in 2000 (NA was number two) to relatively minor players in 2010, and likely non-players in the years to come. 

Figure 12 illustrates how SA’s petroleum export sources have diversified since 2000, and how this trend will likely continue in the future. 

In 2000, overwhelmingly, SA’s exports went to NA (88%) and EU (8%).  But, by 2010, exports to NA was down to 66%.  EU as a destination for SA exports increased slightly, to 9% by 2010.  However, by 2010, CH was receiving 14% and APr was receiving 11% of SA’s exports.  By 2021, exports to NA are predicted to be down to 39%, with CH, APr and EU receiving 26%, 16% and 17% of SA’s exports, respectively.

Summary and Conclusions

For the last decade, South America’s exports of 1.1 to 1.3 bby of petroleum (Figure 2), accounted for about 7-8 percent of the global petroleum export pool (Figure 4).  Over the same period, however, South America has been increasingly importing petroleum from other regions of the world.  From 2000 to 2010, South America’s petroleum imports increased from 0.4 bby to 0.6 bby, a fifty percent increase (Figure 1).   Imports of crude oil are trending downward while imports of petroleum products are trending upwards (Figure 3).   

In the past decade, North America and Africa, as petroleum import sources to South America, have increased, while the Middle East and Former Soviet Union as import sources have gone down substantially (Figure 9).  Over the same period, North America as petroleum export destination for South America petroleum has gone down, while China, other Asia Pacific countries (except Japan), and Europe have gone up (Figure 10).  If these trends were to continue, South America may one day become a net importer of petroleum from North America and a strong exporter to China and the other Asia Pacific countries (Figures 11 and 12).  From a South American perspective, these trends might be seen as a desirable diversification of South American petroleum export destinations.  From a North American perspective, this trend might be viewed as a redistribution of South America’s petroleum wealth away from North America, and towards China and other Asia Pacific countries. 

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Next time I will cross the Atlantic and examine Africa's petroleum Export and Import Trends.