Sunday, February 6, 2011

An Export Land Model Analysis for the USA-Part 3

In Part 1, I presented my best estimate Export Land Model analysis for the USA, based on my analysis of trends in petroleum production and consumption for the USA and its top ten import sources (“the top ten”). 

In Part 2, I examined pessimistic and optimistic Export Land Model scenarios based on alternative interpretations about the trends in petroleum production and consumption for the USA and the top ten.

Here in Part 3, I look at some implicit assumptions that are part of the Export Land Model analysis—assumptions about the fungibility of the exportable global supply of oil, assumptions about the behaviors of the top ten facing peak oil, and, assumptions about the ERoEI of the remaining oil supply. 

In Parts 1 and 2, I predicted that several of the USA’s top ten import source countries will hit net zero exports in the next twenty years.  Throughout this article, I will use the term “ex-exporter” to signify a previously net petroleum exporting country (i.e., a positive quantity from domestic petroleum production minus consumption) that has recently hit zero net exports. 

The Fungibility of Oil

 It is probably a new low to be citing “Dogbert,” but I think the dog portrays the traditional view of oil about right: oil production from any source is assumed to go into one big “fungible pool” of world supply, and, the price of oil reflects the total demand for that supply.  If demand goes up, that drives up the price, which in turn, causes more oil to be extracted from an assumed, “endless” supply in the ground.

I think that this view is related to an assumption implicitly made in my Export Land Model analysis: once a top ten exporter to the USA hits zero net exports, it just “goes away” and imports oil from “somewhere else” or lives within its own production means.  This assumption means that these ex-exporters from the top ten do not draw into the remaining pool of exports that the USA is importing from. 

That could happen if the ex-exporters decide to start reducing their consumption to match their declining production—living within their own means, as it were.  It is much more likely, however, that the ex-exporters will try to transition into being net petroleum importers, just like most, if not all, ex-exporters in the past have done (e.g., the USA and more recently the UK, China, Indonesia, etc...). 

If there really was an “endless” supply of oil—or at least the top ten contributed a relatively minor amount to the global supply of exportable oil, then this assumption of fungibility would not be too important.  The USA could continue to get its imports from the remaining top ten, and my model’s prediction of USA consumption would remain undisturbed by the importing activities of the ex-exporters. 

Unfortunately, that is not case here because these top ten do make up a substantial fraction of the total world export supply. 

Just how much oil do the top ten contribute to the total world supply of exportable oil? 

Fortunately, a recent article by George Lordos titled, Net Oil Exports Will Drop To Zero Long Before Oil Production Does (a truism if I ever heard one) provided the number that I need to estimate just how much.  Table 1 of Lordos’s article indicates that the sum of net exports from all current (2009) exporters equaled 44895 kbd or 16.4 bbs/yr.  From my analysis in Part 1, I can calculate that the sum of the 2009 exporters from the top ten USA import sources equals 9.38 bbs/yr.  From this, I estimate that the top ten contribute 57% of the total world export supply. 

That is, the top ten suppliers to the USA, as a group, contributed more than half of the global supply of exportable oil.  To assume that an ex-exporter would not tap into a portion of the exports from the remaining top ten is tantamount to saying that this source of oil is not fungible.    Dogbert would have an issue with this, and I think he would have a point.

My Fungibility Assumption
Rather, if we assume that the exportable oil is “perfectly fungible,” then an ex-exporter from the top ten exporters who transitions into being an importer should get 57% of their imports from the remaining top 10.  That, in turn, would cut into the exports available for the USA to import. 

The same is actually true now for Canada, which, as I pointed out here, presently exports more (73% of its total production) than its net exportable petroleum to the USA, and therefore must also import petroleum from other net exporting countries.  If I assume “perfect fungible,” then 57% of the petroleum that Canada imports would come from the remaining top ten (my trend analysis for Canada already accounted for the petroleum that Canada gets back from the USA, corresponding to 12% of Canada’s consumption). 

Looking at the top ten as composite group
Before looking at the effects of fungibility, let’s first briefly review my previous best estimate Export Land Model analysis—except this time with a group perspective of the top ten import sources.

Figure 8 shows the sum of the reported production (light blue open circles), consumption (brown open circle) and the sum of report net exports (green open circles) from the top ten import sources to the USA, and, my corresponding prediction curves (solid light blue, brown and green lines) based on my best estimate assumptions, described in part 1.  Also shown for reference, is the reported production and consumption for the USA (solid blue and red circles) and my prediction curves (dark blue and red lines) for the USA, also described in part 1 (i.e., this is the same data shown in Figure 3 of part 1).

Figure 8 nicely illustrates how the sum of the predicted decline curves for exports (solid green line) is substantially steeper than the sum of the decline curves for production.  The steep rate of decline of the exports (about -5%/yr from 2010 to 2022 is due to the combination of decreasing production and increasing consumption by the top ten exporters, as a group. 

The sum of consumption from the top ten (brown line) looks like a straight +1.1%/yr increase from 2010 to 2030 (a 21% increase in consumption from 2010 over 20 yr; r2>0.99).  That’s because some of the top ten (e.g., Canada, Mexico, Russia, Brazil) were predicted to have flat or declining consumption over this period) while others (the remaining top ten) are predicted to have exponentially increasing consumption.  As a composite group, consumption gives the appearance of a linear increase.

The sum of net exports flattens out at 2023 because my assumption was that the ex-exporters just “go away,” and that the remaining exporters (mainly Canada, Iraq and Brazil) continue to export their respective same fractional amounts to the USA.

Quantifying the Effects of the Fungibility Assumption
To assess the effects of the fungibility assumption, I analyzed my prediction data for the top ten USA import sources in a way that considers the exportable oil from the top ten as a fungible sum that gets proportionately distributed to Canada and to the ex-exporters and then to the USA.  

Figure 9 shows the same data as in Figure 8, but now with fungibility considered quantitatively, as follows: 
1) I calculated that on average (from 1985 to 2009) 34.7 ± 0.05 percent of the sum of the reported exports from the top ten went to the USA.  I have assumed that this same percentage of 34.7% will continue to be exported to the USA going forward.
2) I assumed that 57% of oil imports are first distributed to Canada, and the ex-exporters, and then 34.7 % of the remainder goes to the USA.  I made this assumption because I wanted to see what the maximum impact of my fungibility assumption would have on the USA. 
3) As in Part 1, I assumed that US consumption can be estimated from the sum of US production plus net exports for the top ten, all divided by 0.86. 
In contrast to the predicted sum of net exports shown in Figure 8 (the red dashed line in Figure 9), the sum of net exports continues to decline after the inflection point at 2023, albeit at a slightly slower rate.  The reason for the continued decline is that, now, as the top ten exporters (i.e., Mexico, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, Russia Angola, Algeria) drop out and are assumed to become importers, they draw 57% of their imports from the sum of exportable oil from the remaining top ten.  Additionally, 57% of Canada’s imports from the top ten draws from the sum of exportable oil is now considered. 

Consequently, there is less oil available for the US to import, and therefore, US consumption (solid red line) is lower than predicted in Figure 8. 

The effect of my fungibility assumption on the US consumption does not look that dramatic to start with, but then it becomes increasingly important in the 2020s.  For instance, by 2030, my estimate of US consumption (Figure 8 or Figure 9 dashed red line) is 4.11 bbs/yr, whereas with fungibility considered, my estimate of US consumption is predicted to be 30% lower, at 2.87 bbs/yr. 

My assumptions that the pool of exportable oil being first distributed to Canada and to the ex-exporters, and then 34.7 % of the remainder going to the USA, tends to  maximize the effects of the fungibility assumption on decreasing USA consumption.  I would expect that the reality would probably be somewhere between the solid red line and the dashed red line in Figure 9.

Figures 10 and 11 show the same analysis done for the pessimistic and optimistic estimates, respectively (corresponding to Figures 4 and 5, respectively, in part 2). 

Once again, these plots nicely illustrate how the declines in the sum of exports are steeper that the decline in production because rising consumption by the top ten, as a group, detracts from exports. 

For the pessimistic estimate, the rate of decline in the sum of exports from the top ten from 2010 to 2023 equals  -6.3 %/yr.  This decline rate is similar to the -6.2%/yr decline rate that was predicted by Brown and Foucher for the sum of the top five global exporters in 2007 (see e.g., Figure 17 in Quantitative Assessment of Future Net Oil Exports by the Top Five Net Oil Exporters).  The effect of the fungibility assumption on the pessimistic estimate is about the same as it was for my best estimate.  For instance, the USA’s predicted consumption by 2030 is about 30% lower if the fungibility assumption is made, as compared to if it is not made.  

For the optimistic estimate, after a very mild -0.9 %/yr decline in the sum of exports from the top ten from 2010 (10.6 bbs/yr) to 2026 (9 bbs/yr), the decline rate picks up to -4.8%/yr from 2027 to 2040.  The effect of the fungibility assumption on the optimistic estimate is milder than for the best estimate or pessimistic estimate.  For instance, the USA’s predicted consumption by 2030 is only about 7% lower if fungibility considered, as compared to if it is not considered.  

Can you see why fungibility is not as important for the optimistic estimate?

Until the top ten exporters become ex-exporters and start to import, they do not draw down on the exports from the remaining top ten.  Additionally, for the effect to be prominent, one needs large petroleum consumers transitioning from exporter to importer, because then the quantity of petroleum  imported will be large, and, growing ever larger.  For the optimistic scenario, only Venezuela, Russia and Angola hits zero net exports by 2030 (Algeria just starts to hit zero exports in 2030).  But only one these counties—Russia is predicted to be relatively heavy consumer when they hit zero-net exports. 

In comparison for my best estimate or pessimistic estimates, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, two relatively heavy petroleum consumers, are added to the list of ex-exporters in 2015 and 2023, respectively.   

The Behavior of the ex-Exporters
As discussed above, my fungibility assumption is that when their domestic consumption increases to the point where the exporters need their own oil for their own domestic use, they will stop exporting and start importing petroleum.

As recently pointed out by gail-the-actuary, in What Lies behind Egypt’s Problems? How do They Affect Others?,  the recent troubles in Egypt may reflect what happens when a developing country makes the transition from exporter to importer, with relative little else to support the economy when petroleum export revenues cease.  I suspect that a similar fate awaits many of the ex-exporters among the top ten.

Even after hitting, or approaching, zero net exports, exporters may still have to export because they can't refine their own oil, or, because they need the income.  Exporters know that there is a price to pay for shipping their oil to other countries to get refined—and that price is typically paid in a share of the oil itself.  Additionally, government revenues and the total GDP of many developing countries that are oil exporters rely heavily on oil exports.  Consider the top ten, for example.  The EIA country analysis briefs give the following percentages of total government revenues or total GDP that are based on oil exports:
Mexico—40% of government revenues,
Venezuela—50% of government revenues,
Nigeria—65% of government revenues,
Angola—80% of GDP;
Algeria—30% of GDP;
Iraq—66% of GDP;
Saudi Arabia—40% of GDP; and

Hitting net-zero exports will put these countries, like Egypt, in a very tough economic position.  I expect that at least some of them will have to continue exporting oil at the cost of limiting their own domestic consumption.  Limiting domestic consumption, however, will stifle the country’s ability to diversify its economy so as to be less dependent on oil income.  Civil unrest, and even regime change, is possible in such an environment.

Is Voluntary Conservation Realistic?— hypothetical scenarios for Saudi Arabia and Russia
Before hitting net-zero exports, wouldn’t it be rational for an “export land” to keep some oil in the ground for the use and prosperity of future generations?

There are some signs that at least some oil exporters are thinking of conservation:

"I keep no secret from you that when there were some new finds, I told them, 'no, leave it in the ground, with grace from god, our children need it'," King Abdullah said in remarks made late on Saturday, SPA said. 

Tom Petrie, vice president, Merrill Lynch:
“King Abdullah’s quote speaks to the fast-emerging reality of what I call ‘practical peak oil.’ The Saudis and other exporters are placing a new emphasis on elongating the petroleum exploitation and depletion cycle. This stems from a growing awareness of the challenges of conventional resource maturity, as well as rising resource nationalism. This is likely to result in an earlier occurrence of global peak oil output than many consumers yet recognize.”

Chris Skrebowski, editor of Petroleum Review:
“In any case, there is now a broad-based move by energy exporters, including Russia, Angola, Azerbaijan, and Norway, to restrict expansion to maximize plateau flows. If this takes hold, then global supplies will reach a peak rather earlier than analysis of future projects would indicate.”

If the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or Russia, or others, try to cut back on their exports and conserve, they would have to do so very carefully so as not upset oil revenues and GDP by too much in any one year.  A major risk here, in my opinion, would domestic civil unrest.  If the world’s top two exporters, Saudi Arabia and Russia, did decide to conserve by limiting production, what would this look like, and, what affect might this have on US imports and consumption?

For instance, let’s say that King Abdullah and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, both ambitiously decide to reduce their rates of production from 2010 and forward, for the benefit of the next generation.  According to my analysis of the production data using the Hubbert equation, Q¥, the total recoverable petroleum equals 151.8 bbs and 85.6 bbs for Saudi Arabia and Russia, respectively.  By 2009, the remaining amounts yet to be recovered are predicted to equal 54.8 bbs and 36.7, respectively.  If this remaining oil was produced at a constant rate over the next 30 years from 2010 to 2040, then Saudi Arabia’s and Russia’s production would be reduced to 1.83 bbs/yr and 1.22 bbs/yr, respectively.  Those are 48% and 66% reductions in production compared to 2009 levels.

Russia could do this, in principle, because their consumption rate is predicted to be flat or declining (about 1 to 0.9 bbs/yr) over this period. 

Saudi Arabia, could not as easily do this, because their predicted exponentially increasing rate of consumption still drives them into net zero exports by about 2027—that’s only a four year reprieve compared to my original prediction of net zero exports by 2023.  To make this work for 30 years Saudi Arabia would also have to limit its domestic consumption rate to a number at or below 1.83 bbs/yr.  Let’s assume that they allow consumption to increase to 1.46 bbs/yr and ten freeze it at 20% below the 1.83 bbs/yr production rate.  At its present growth rate, Saudi Arabia will reach that level of consumption by 2020—this would still allow a 55% increase over 2009 levels. 

Figure 12 shows the effects that these assumption would have on the sum of the exports from the top ten and on USA consumption (solid red) as compared to my best estimate (dashed red line corresponding to the red line in Figure 8). 

It is apparent that the effect on USA consumption, as compare to my original best estimate, is quite minor. 

The reason why is clear: my original estimate includes the prediction that Saudi Arabia and Russia would hit zero net exports by 2023.  With the present conservation assumptions, Saudi Arabia and Russia actually have a slightly positive effect on US consumption after 2023 because these two countries continue to be net exporters.  But the relative amount of petroleum being exported is small and a still smaller fraction of this goes to the USA (about 18% and 8% for Saudi Arabia and Russia, respectively). 

As also shown in Figure 12, an immediate 48% (Saudi Arabia) and 66% (Russian) reduction in production in 2010 would not directly impact US consumption very much.   There is only a 6% larger drop in consumption as compared to my best estimate.

In contrast, these conservation measures would have a devastating effect on consumption in Europe and Asia, because this is where the bulk of Saudi Arabia’s and Russia’s petroleum is presently exported to.  For instance, according to the EIA’s country analysis brief for Saudi Arabia, 50% of crude oil and refined products goes to Asia, and about 10% goes to Europe.  According to the EIA’s country analysis brief for Russia, 81% of crude oil exports go to Europe, and 12% go to Asia. 

Therefore it is likely that austerity measures of the magnitude assumed here would crash the economies of Europe and Asia.  Of course, if my fungibility assumption holds, then this would indirectly impact US imports as Europe and Asia scour for alternative import sources to replace the difference. 

But could the governments of Saudi Arabia and Russia, as authoritarian as they are, really reduce their production by 48% and 66%?  I seriously doubt it. 

Reducing production by 48% and 66% would cause petroleum exports to drop by 85% and 93% for Saudi Arabia and Russia, respectively.  But, petroleum exports account for 40% and 20-25% of the GDP of Saudi Arabia and Russia, respectively.  Therefore cutting production would mean dramatic cuts to GDP.  For example, for this voluntary conservation scenario, Saudi Arabia’s GDP would be drop by 34% and Russia‘s GDP would drop 18-23%.   That would be enough to cause a serious economic recession in both countries. 

The governments that caused the recession would be facing serious civil unrest and protests—not unlike in Egypt presently.  In my opinion, neither government would be willing to risk this.

Conservation for the Exporting Developing Countries is Unlikely
For the same reasons, I expect that the developing countries among the top ten (Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, Angola, Algeria, Iraq) will not conserve, but instead, try to follow the same trend as earlier ex-exporters that became net importers.  That is, rather than conserve, they will just continue to export their oil and use the revenues to grow their domestic economy, this in turn, will cause the rate of domestic petroleum consumption to increase. 

After they reach peak production (“peak oil”) and then hit zero net exports, they will suddenly discover themselves to be net oil importers.  This may be tractable at first, because the relative amount of imports to total consumption would be small.  Consequently, domestic consumption rate will continue to increase.  At the point when there are not enough oil left from the remaining “export lands” to supply the increasing numbers of oil importing countries, domestic consumption rates will have to decline, globally. 

Those countries that can still produce a substantial fraction of their own oil will suffer less than those countries that have to import most or all of their oil.  Some former exporting countries that produce oil will still have to export oil in exchange for the things that they need (e.g., food, weapons, high-tech goods, refined petroleum products) and that will cut into government revenues and GDP.  Domestic civil unrest will be the likely result.

What about ERoEI?
ERoEI, or EROI (energy return on investment), is the ratio of the amount of usable energy acquired from a particular energy resource to the amount of energy expended to obtain that energy resource.

from Wikipedia, EROEI

Energy return on energy invested (ERoEI), like the Export Land Model, is a simple but important concept.  

Charles Hall, who takes credit for bringing the concept of ERoEI to the realm of petroleum production has succinctly pointed out that ERoEI is really just a “Best First” principle:

Humans use high quality, low cost resources before low quality, high cost resources

Charles A. S. Hall and Cutler J. Cleveland
Presented at ASPO -US conference Denver November 10, 2005
Available at Hall’s College of Environmental Science & Forestry website here.

That is, not all petroleum resources are the same: some require more energy to extract and refine than others.  The easy-to-extract oil is history and included in past production.  Now the world is left with the increasingly difficult—energy expensive—sources of oil to extract and refine.  The USA’s Bakken oil formation, the Alberta tar sands in Canada, and the sub-salt fields off the coast of Brazil, are all examples of the present and future petroleum resources that have a much lower ERoEI, than more traditional resources like the oil fields of Texas 50 years ago, or, of Saudi Arabia 20 years ago.

An equally important point raised by Hall is that:

The question is not how much oil is in the ground but rather how much can be gained with a significant energy profit (EROI)

Charles A. S. Hall Economic Implications of Changing EROI Ratios (slide 50)

At the point where the amount of energy expended to extract and refine the petroleum from any one petroleum resource equals or exceeds the amount of usable energy acquired, then production from that resource will stop.

I think that a pending example of this is corn-based ethanol production in the USA.  With an ERoEI of less than 2:1 (maybe 1:1 by some estimates!) the day that the Federal government stops subsidizing this industry, through grants, tariffs and import restrictions, is the day that the corn based ethanol production in the USA will stop (see A Bad Policy That Refuses to Die).

When ELM meets ERoEI—a Triple Exponential Effect
What effect does considering ERoEI have on the Export Land Model and how can we look at these two effects quantitatively?

To some extent, the Export Land Model should consider already at least a portion of the energy expenses associated with production.  A portion of domestic petroleum consumption will correspond to the petroleum directly expended on the recovery and refining of crude oil, tar sands, NGL etc...  But it is hard to determine was fraction of energy expenditure this corresponds to.  It is a daunting task to fully account for all of the energy expended on petroleum production.  Moreover, the ERoEI ratio would likely differ from one country to the next and from one petroleum resource to the next.

Therefore, in the analysis to follow, I have merely tried to assess the general effects of a declining ERoEI.  I did this by converting an assumed increase in the energy expended on production into equivalent barrels of oil and adding this to a country’s domestic consumption. 

Based on the estimates Hall presented EROI: definition, history and future implications  in the analysis to follow, I have assumed that the overall ERoRI ratio for both the USA and the top ten exporters will go from a present value of 20:1 to 2:1 over the next twenty years.  I also assumed that the rate of decline in ERoEI will be linear.  Specifically, I assumed that the ERoEI declines from 20:1 in 2010 at 0.9/yr to get to 2:1 in 2030.

For example, if in 2010, Saudi Arabia’s predicted production is 3.5 bbs/yr, then the additional consumption due to energy invested in production (in equivalent barrels of oil) is assumed to equal 0.18 bbs/yr (i.e., 3.5/20=.18).  If in 2030 Saudi Arabia’s predicted production is 2.7 bbs/yr, then the additional consumption due to energy invested in production (in equivalent barrels of oil) is assumed to equal 1.35 bbs/yr (i.e., 2.7/2=1.35).  These additional consumption estimates gets subtracted from Saudi Arabia’s production, along with other domestic consumption, to produce an ERoEO-adjusted net export rate for each year. 

As another example, if US production in 2010 is predicted to be 2.38 bbs/yr, then the additional consumption due to energy invested in production (in equivalent barrels of oil) is assumed to equal 0.12 bbs/yr (i.e., 2.38/20=.12).  If US production in 2030 is predicted to be 1.88 bbs/yr, then the additional consumption due to energy invested in production is assumed to equal 0.94 bbs/yr (i.e., 1.88/2=.94).  These numbers get subtracted from my previously predicted USA consumption  rate (i.e., USA production plus exports from the top ten, all divided by 0.86) to produce an ERoEI-adjusted predicted consumption.

Can you picture what my assumption of an annual linear decrease in ERoEI would have on additional energy consumption with time? 

Here’s some help, using the numbers from my best estimate predictions for USA production:

Yes, that right, yet another exponential curve!  The effect on added consumption really become prominent from 2027 on when the ERoEI drops below 5:1.

Similarly, the ERoEI-adjusted net exports from the top ten, as a group, are the sum of a triple exponential effect:  exponentially decreasing production; exponentially increasing domestic consumption, and, exponentially increasing energy expenditures to produce the petroleum. 

If you are getting the sense that this story will not end well for the USA’s petroleum consumption—then you are correct.  

Figure 14 shows the effect of my ERoEI assumption as applied to my best estimate assumptions about production and consumption for the USA and the top ten.  Figure 14 shows the same data as in Figure 8, except that now, from 2010 and on, the energy expenditures on petroleum production are added to the sum of predicted consumption for the top ten, which in turn gets subtracted from net-exports.  Plus US consumption is reduced by the added amounts of energy expended on domestic production.

The most noticeable difference compared to Figure 8 is that exports and US consumption tail off  for a much short period after 2022 and then start to curl down.  For instance, now, instead of a fairly lengthy plateau in net-exports from 2023 to 2030, net-exports plateau for about 5 years and then curves down towards zero as the ERoEI drop to less than 5:1 in 2027.  It looks like net-exports would hit zero shortly after 2030.  Additionally, now from 2010-2022 instead of a -5%/yr decline in net exports we have a 6%/yr decline. 

Combining ELM, Fungibility and ERoEI assumptions—off with their tails!
My original Export Land Model analysis assumed that the ex-exporter simply “go away” and either live within their own production means, or, import oil from countries other than the top ten.  Figure 9 shows the correction for this effect by assuming that a 57% fraction will come from the remaining exporters of the top ten.

Figure 15 show what happens if we add my ERoEI assumption to the fungibility-corrected exports.  Now neither sum of exports nor US consumption have any tails.

Rather, the sum of exports from the top ten, as a group, are on a steady -6%/yr decline until hitting zero net exports in 2027.  At this point, I assume that the USA is on its own and now is forced to live within it own means of producing petroleum.  But by then, the ERoEI is headed toward 2:1 and by 2030, the USA’s predicted effective consumption is predicted to equal about 1 bbs/yr.  That’s about half of the USA’s production rate of 2 bbs/yr—at a ratio of 2:1, the other half is expended on production.  Thereafter, if the ERoEI stabilized at 2:1, and if the USA didn’t export any petroleum, then US consumption would also stabilize at about 1 bbs/yr.

Alright, that is it!  In the fourth and final part of this series, I will give a summary of the results of this analysis and discuss what implications this has for the USA and globally.


  1. Veeeery interesting.

    By way of comparison, does anyone know what the ERoI on wind turbines is? Solar panels?

  2. Helix, at least for wind, its about 40:1, according to slide 22 of Charlie Hall's presentation, cited above. It can get very tricky to decide what goes into the "Energy In" part of the ratio, if you want to consider the total cost to build the turbine, maintenance etc... Plus, additional energy costs if using the electricity as a transport fuel.


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